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OPINION
The Legality of Assaulting Ideas
Gary Slapper*
Professor of Law, Director of the Centre for Law, The Open University
Humanity is not at its best when racist. A madness at the heart of racism
was captured in a letter Groucho Marx wrote to an exclusive country
club that had just barred his family from its swimming pool as it did not
admit Jews. Marx wrote to the club, referring to his daughter Melinda,
and asked, ‘Since my daughter is only half-Jewish would it be alright if
she went in the pool only up to her waist?’
Historically, racism in Britain was common. It even hissed from
people in high places, including the Bench. In the 1970s and 1980s,
various Acts prohibiting racist conduct were milestones on the path to
civilisation. More recently, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006
extended the field of unlawful hate-mongering. It prohibits the stirring
up of hatred on religious grounds. The Act, however, stipulates that it is
not an offence to attack the ideas of any religion or body of thought. That
licence is a good thing. In allowing such assaults on ideas, the law
protects a freedom of immeasurable importance in a democracy.
The most significant thing about anyone’s beliefs is that they are just
that: beliefs. We inhabit a society comprised of a considerable palate of
supposed fundamental truths, many of which are oppositional. Society
is organic. It is not inert. It develops, and the best way for it to develop
smoothly and peaceably is for all ideas to be subject to rigorous public
debate.
Racism
In relatively recent history, society was tolerant of racist attitudes even
among those occupying elevated office. In a trial in London in 1978 at
the Central Criminal Court, a jury found that a man who had in a speech
used the words ‘niggers, wogs and coons’ was not guilty of inciting racial
hatred. The trial judge, however, Judge Neil McKinnon QC, himself a
white Australian, had told the jury that the words in question were not
necessarily inflammatory because, among other reasons, the judge’s
nickname at school had been ‘nigger’ and he had not been offended to be
called that name. He said:
In this England of ours at the moment we are allowed to have our own
views still, thank goodness. (The Times, 7 January 1978)
In his closing remarks, after the racist had been acquitted, the judge said
to him in court, ‘By all means propagate the views you have . . . I wish
you well’.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Open University or The Journal of Criminal Law.
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Happily, today, we would not countenance such warped reasoning
from a judge. Today’s social climate, reinforced through law, is less
acquiescent in speech that encourages one group of people to despise
another group on the basis of race. Today, racism or apparent racism is
not accepted in public life. In March 2007, for example, Patrick Mercer,
a senior white Conservative politician and Homeland Security Spokes-
person, was immediately sacked from that office by the leader of his
party after saying, without an expression of regret, that being called a
‘black bastard’ is part-and-parcel of life for ethnic minorities in the
Armed Forces (The Times, 9 March 2007).
It should be underlined, though, that no legal proceedings were
brought against Mr Mercer for this outburst as none was appropriate on
these facts. This is a good illustration of why legally guaranteed freedom
of expression is desirable and should not be curtailed in order to sanitise
society of offensive comment. One of the great virtues of free speech is
that idiocy will wilt under public scrutiny. It is regrettable that incendi-
ary remarks can still come from people one step from government. But
it is a benefit of freedom of expression, protected by the Human Rights
Act, that we get to learn what Mr Mercer thinks while he is still treading
an intended path to power.
Criticising ideas not condemning people
The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 creates new offences by
amending the Public Order Act 1986. The new offences of stirring up
hatred on religious grounds apply to various situations including the use
of words or behaviour or display of written material (new s. 29B of the
1986 Act), publishing or distributing written material (new s. 29C),
the public performance of a play (new s. 29D), and broadcasting (new
s. 29F). For each offence the words, behaviour, written material, record-
ings or programmes must be threatening and intended to stir up reli-
gious hatred. Religious hatred means hatred against a group of persons
defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.
The reference to ‘religious belief or lack of religious belief’ is a broad
one, and is in line with the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9
of the European Convention on Human Rights. It includes religions
widely recognised in Britain such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism,
Judaism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Rastafarianism, Baha'ism, Zoroastrianism
and Jainism. Equally, branches or sects within a religion can be con-
sidered as religions or religious beliefs in their own right (see www.uk-
legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en2006/2006en01.htm).
Crucially, Parliament legislated (inserting 29J, a new section in the
Public Order Act 1986) to guarantee a healthy freedom of speech. The
new section permits criticism and ridicule of any belief system. It
reads:
Protection of freedom of expression
29J. Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which
prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy,
dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or
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practices of their adherents, or of any other belief system or the beliefs
or practices of its adherents, or proselytising or urging adherents of a
different religion or belief system to cease practising their religion or belief
system.
This is a most valuable right for those who wish to speak freely against
the religious ideas held by some people. To criticise an idea is not to
insult the person who holds the idea. If attacking an idea were indis-
tinguishable from attacking its adherents, and saying someone was
‘wrong’ were the same thing as saying they were ‘despicable’, then most
discourse would end in bloodshed.
Some people (who lost the parliamentary debate) argued for a sort of
legal sacrosanctity for religious ideas, so that, in a medieval way, anyone
who attacked a religious article of faith would be committing a crime.
Such a law would have meant that a religion could favour, say, children
coming into contact with not more than one person of their age group
during any given month, while no one could speak against the imposi-
tion of such dreadful nonsense because to do so might be to offend the
believers by attacking their dogma.
The precious value of free debate
The growing inclination of religious organisations to act to extinguish
the expression of ideas they do not like should be seen as a profoundly
disturbing development. The right of people to express unpopular ideas,
or ideas that offend certain parts of society, is a defining characteristic of
an open democracy. It is from a free, wide, robust and animated debate
that progress is made in any part of life.
Sensibly, legal constraints prevent people from saying things which
incite racial hatred. That is because people do not choose their race. But
people can and do choose their ideas. So, for ‘consumer protection’, the
public forum in which ideas are debated and put on offer should be a
lively place with no dogmas being given false protection from
criticism.
Supposing I am an adherent of Boxism, a religion asserting that the
world was created by three invisible boxes 4,000 years ago. Should I
be allowed to prevent people from ridiculing my worship of the boxes?
No. Should I be able to silence critics by telling society that Boxism
itself declares opposition to it to be unacceptable and punishable treach-
ery? No.
In a democracy, diverse opinions should flourish. In the phrase of one
great American judge, Justice Jackson, in 1943, ‘Compulsory unification
of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard’.
The Legality of Assaulting Ideas
281
